Strategic enforcement of anti-discrimination law : a new role for Australia\u27s equality commissions by Allen, Dominique
          Deakin Research Online 
 
This is the published version:  
 
Allen, Dominique 2011, Strategic enforcement of anti-discrimination law : a new role for 
Australia's equality commissions, Monash University law review, pp. 1-26. 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30033127 
 
Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner.  
 
Copyright : 2011, Monash University, Faculty of Law 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722409
1 
 
STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW: A 
NEW ROLE FOR AUSTRALIA’S EQUALITY COMMISSIONS 
DOMINIQUE ALLEN* 
 
WORKING PAPER MAY 2011 
 
In Australia, anti-discrimination law is enforced by individuals who lodge a discrimination complaint 
at a statutory equality commission. The equality commission is responsible for handling complaints 
and attempting to resolve them. In most instances, the equality commission cannot advise or assist the 
complainant; it must remain neutral. In other countries, the equality commission plays a role in 
enforcement, principally by providing complainants with assistance to resolve their complaint 
including funding litigation. The equality commission’s assistance function has been most effective 
when used strategically as part of a broader enforcement program, rather than on an ad hoc basis. 
This article discusses equality commission enforcement in the United States of America, Britain, 
Northern Ireland and Ireland and shows how the equality commissions in those countries have 
engaged in strategic enforcement in order to develop the law and secure remedies which benefit the 
wider community, not only the individual complainant. Based on their experience, it is argued that the 
Australian equality commissions should play a role in enforcement so that they can tackle 
discrimination more effectively. 
 
I    INTRODUCTION 
In Australia, anti-discrimination law is constructed around an individual complaints-based model. The 
law is enforced by individual victims of discrimination who lodge complaints at the statutory equality 
commission1 in their jurisdiction or at the Australian Human Rights Commission (‘AHRC’). The role 
of the equality commission is to receive the complaint, investigate it and ascertain whether it comes 
within its jurisdiction and, if so, attempt to resolve it using Alternative Dispute Resolution (‘ADR’). If 
it cannot be resolved, the complainant can ask the equality commission to refer the complaint to court 
for adjudication.  
The premise of this article is that discrimination will not be tackled effectively in Australia until the 
equality commissions play a role in enforcing the law. This article examines one means of enforcement 
— assisting complainants to resolve their complaint. As Part II shows, the Australian equality 
commissions are primarily concerned with handling and resolving complaints. Two can assist 
complainants, but that is the exception, not the norm. This is contrasted with the equality commissions 
in the United States, Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland. In these countries, the equality commissions 
can assist complainants, which includes providing informed advice about the merits of their complaint, 
arranging legal representation and funding litigation. Examples of how these equality commissions 
                                                 
* B Comm (Canberra) LLB(Hons) (ANU) PhD (Melbourne) Lecturer, School of Law, Deakin 
University. This article draws upon research conducted for the project ‘Improving the Effectiveness of 
Australia’s Anti-discrimination Laws’, which was funded by the Australian Research Council and the 
Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission. Thanks to Beth Gaze, Jenny Morgan and 
Fiona Hanlon for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article and to the anonymous referees 
for their valuable suggestions. Any errors are my own. 
1 The agencies created by anti-discrimination statutes not only vary in functions and responsibilities, 
they are also identified differently. The statutory agency is usually an Anti-Discrimination or Equal 
Opportunity Commission, Authority or Board. The federal agency and those in the Australian Capital 
Territory and Victoria have additional responsibilities for human rights and this is identified in their 
title. Similarly, the overseas agencies are identified in a variety of ways. For ease of reference, 
particularly to the overseas agencies, ‘equality commission’ is used throughout when referring to the 
agency in general terms. It may be argued that this is not the most accurate descriptor of the Australian 
agencies at present considering that the bulk of their workload is handling discrimination complaints. 
Given that the premise of this article is that the agency’s role in tackling discrimination and inequality 
would be strengthened if it played a role in enforcement, ‘equality’ was selected in preference to ‘equal 
opportunity’ or ‘anti-discrimination’ commission. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722409
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have used their assistance function are presented in Part III to show that by using this mechanism 
strategically, the equality commissions have developed the law and obtained remedies that extend 
beyond the individual complainant. Assistance is part of a broader strategy of enforcing the law, so it is 
used in conjunction with lobbying, education and communication. Based on the experience of the 
overseas equality commissions, Part IV proposes five reasons why it would be valuable for the 
Australian equality commissions to engage in assistance work. Essentially, the benefits of this function 
are that it would enable the equality commission to take a strategic approach to developing the 
jurisprudence and maintaining the law’s profile. This would filter down and affect both the informal 
complaint resolution process and future cases. One of the equality commission’s functions is to 
promote voluntary compliance and it is argued that this ‘carrot’ would be more effective if it was 
accompanied by the ‘stick’ of litigation from an experienced ‘repeat player’. 
 
Table 1: Equality Commissions 
Equality Commission Jurisdiction Acronym 
Australian Human Rights Commission Australia AHRC 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission United States of America USEEOC 
Equality and Human Rights Commission Britain UKEHRC 
Commission for Racial Equality Britain UKCRE  
Equal Opportunities Commission Britain UKEOC 
Disability Rights Commission Britain UKDRC 
Equality Commission for Northern Ireland Northern Ireland ECNI 
Equality Authority Ireland IEA 
 
II    THE EQUALITY COMMISSION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Violations of anti-discrimination laws are civil wrongs, somewhat like torts, for which victims have the 
right to seek redress. Enforcement is achieved through what Dickens terms a ‘two-pronged approach’2 
— individual complaints and equality commission enforcement. Part II shows that in Australia, the law 
is primarily enforced through individual complaints. This is contrasted with the position in the United 
States, Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland which also permit equality commission enforcement. 
Having established that the primary means of enforcement by the overseas equality commissions is by 
providing assistance to individual complainants, Part II concludes by highlighting the importance of 
taking a strategic approach to this activity. In this context, ‘enforcement’ refers to compliance with the 
law, primarily the non-discrimination principle, rather than the enforcement of a court judgment.3 
Enforcement is also distinguished from ‘complaint handling’, which is the process of receiving and 
investigating a discrimination complaint. As this section explains, some equality commissions are only 
responsible for enforcement; others are also responsible for complaint handling. 
 
A    Australia 
1    Individual Complaints 
                                                 
2 Linda Dickens, ‘The Road is Long: Thirty Years of Equality Legislation in Britain’ (2007) 45 British 
Journal of Industrial Relations 463, 474 et seq. 
3 On enforcement in the anti-discrimination context, see Martin MacEwen (ed), Anti-Discrimination 
Law Enforcement: A Comparative Perspective (Avebury, 1997). 
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In Australia, anti-discrimination law is enforced through individual complaints in much the same way 
across the country: an equality commission acts as a ‘gatekeeper’ for complaints meaning that the 
equality commission must have the opportunity to resolve the complaint informally before the 
complainant can litigate.4 To fulfil this function, once the equality commission receives the complaint, 
it conducts an investigation in order to determine whether or not to accept the complaint. If it accepts 
the complaint, the equality commission will attempt to resolve it using ADR, usually conciliation. The 
equality commission does not make a decision on the merits; its role is to facilitate complaint 
resolution as a third party. If the complaint is not resolved, the complainant may decide to litigate. 
Most of the equality commissions’ work centres on receiving and resolving complaints, although the 
equality commissions in Queensland, New South Wales and Western Australia can appear as an 
amicus curiae5 and so can AHRC Commissioners.6 Some State and Territory equality commissions7 
and the AHRC8 can intervene in proceedings with leave of the court. 
 
2    Assisting Individual Complainants 
The majority of Australian equality commissions cannot assist individual complainants or fund 
litigation. The exceptions are the AHRC and the South Australian and Western Australian Equal 
Opportunity Commissions. The AHRC’s assistance is limited and it is not financial. The AHRC can 
only assist a complainant with preparing the court forms to commence proceedings in the Federal 
Court.9 Another option for complainants and respondents in federal matters is to apply to the 
Commonwealth Attorney–General for legal or financial assistance with court proceedings on the basis 
of hardship.10 Since 2000, the Attorney–General has received 27 applications for financial assistance 
on that basis and has only approved nine grants of assistance.11  
Until 2009, the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) stated that the Commissioner must assist a 
complainant with presenting their complaint before the tribunal if requested.12 In a review of the State’s 
anti-discrimination legislation the government said this creates a conflict because the Commission must 
handle the complaint impartially, yet it is required to represent the complainant.13 The review proposed 
repealing the requirement to assist the complainant and appointing an independent solicitor for that 
purpose.14 This proposal was not implemented. Instead, the law was amended to state that the 
Commissioner may provide representation for the complainant or respondent with presenting their 
                                                 
4 From August 2011, complainants in Victoria will have the option of proceeding directly to court: see 
Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic).  
5 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 186; Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 99; Equal 
Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) s 113. 
6 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PV. 
7 Namely, the equality commissions in Queensland, Tasmania and the Northern Territory: Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 235(j); Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 7(b); Anti-
Discrimination Act (NT) s13(q). From August 2011, the Victorian commission will also have the 
power to intervene and appear as amicus: Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) ss 159, 160. 
8 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 11(1)(o); Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 
48(1)(gb).  
9 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PT. 
10 Ibid s 46PU. 
11 Nine applicants did not proceed with their application and nine did not meet the eligibility criteria in 
Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PU(2). Applications are treated in 
confidence by the Attorneys–General, thus further information about the type of complaint or the 
applicant is not available: Email from Terina Koch, Principal Legal Officer, Financial Assistance 
Division, Social Inclusion Division, Attorney-General’s Department to Dominique Allen, 9 August 
2010. 
12 Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) s 95(9), as repealed by Equal Opportunity (Miscellaneous) 
Amendment Act 2009 (SA). 
13 South Australian Government, ‘Review of South Australian Equal Opportunity Legislation’ 
(Framework Paper, 2003) 41. The Opposition also recognised this problem: see South Australia, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 3 June 2009, 3020 (Isobel Redmond, Shadow Attorney–
General).  
14 South Australian Government, ‘Review of South Australian Equal Opportunity Legislation’ 
(Framework Paper, 2003) 40. 
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complaint before the tribunal if requested.15 To date, the Commissioner has not received any requests 
for such assistance.16 
The assistance provided by the Western Australian Equal Opportunity Commission is an anomaly in 
the Australian context. The Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) permits the Commissioner to arrange 
legal representation or funding for the complainant to appear in the Supreme Court.17 The Commission 
is also required to provide the complainant with legal assistance if the Commissioner refers their 
complaint to the State Administrative Tribunal.18 The Act does not specify the type of assistance the 
Commission must provide. In practice, the Commission’s Legal Officers provide legal representation 
and their workload is supplemented by pro bono work conducted by private law firms under an 
arrangement with the Commission.19 Assistance typically involves providing an assessment of the case, 
including the merits, representing the complainant at a directions hearing, and preparing pleadings and 
documents for discovery. If mediation at the Tribunal is not successful and the complainant has an 
arguable chance of success, the Commission’s assistance may extend to a full hearing.20 During the 
2008–09 financial year, the Commissioner referred 42 complaints to the Tribunal.21 Almost 60 per cent 
settled or were withdrawn before hearing.22 Therefore, most of the assistance provided by the 
Commission is at the pre-litigation stage.  
 
3    Fair Work Ombudsman 
On 1 July 2009, the anti-discrimination framework was altered by the commencement of the Fair Work 
Act 2009 (Cth). The Act prohibits employment discrimination across a range of attributes.23 It is 
enforced by the Fair Work Ombudsman (‘FWO’) which has a wide range of powers including carrying 
out investigations, issuing compliance notices and conducting litigation.24 The Act establishes a 
stronger enforcement model for addressing employment discrimination than traditional anti-
discrimination laws, so undoubtedly it will change the anti-discrimination landscape. The discussion in 
this article focuses on the equality commissions because, as the sole regulators of anti-discrimination 
law for over three decades, there is considerable evidence about their operation, whereas the FWO is 
too new to evaluate effectively. Further, limiting the discussion facilitates the comparison with the 
overseas equality commissions. 
 
B    The United States, Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland 
The enforcement of anti-discrimination law in the other countries examined in this article utilises both 
of Dickens’ ‘prongs’ — individual complaints and equality commission enforcement.25 Enforcement 
by the equality commission primarily involves assisting individuals to resolve their complaint. 
Although the equality commissions are empowered to conduct investigations into discrimination, 
principally into instances which appear to be widespread or of a systemic nature,26 for differing reasons 
                                                 
15 Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) s 95C. 
16 Email from Katherine O’Neill, Acting Deputy Commissioner, South Australian Equal Opportunity 
Commission to Dominique Allen, 13 April 2010. 
17 Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) s 93A(1). 
18 Ibid s 93. 
19 Western Australian Equal Opportunity Commission, Annual Report 2006–2007 (2007) 3. 
20 Email from Jeff Rosales-Castaneda, Legal Officer, Western Australian Equality Opportunity 
Commission to Dominique Allen, 22 July 2008. 
21 Western Australian Equal Opportunity Commission, Annual Report 2008–2009 (2009) 43. 
22 37 assisted complaints were carried over from previous years and there were 4 appeals and 
exemption applications, totalling 83 assisted complaints. 64 of those 83 matters were finalised: ibid 43–
4, Tables 18 and 19. 
23 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 351. 
24 Ibid ss 706–17; See also Bill Loizides, ‘FWO Discrimination Policy’ (Guidance Note No 6, 
Australian Government FWO, 17 December 2009)  <http://www.fairwork.gov.au/guidancenotes/GN-6-
FWO-Discrimination-Policy.pdf>.  
25 Above n2. 
26 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 USC §2000e-5(b) (2000); Sex Discrimination Act 
1975 (UK) (‘SDA(UK)’)  c 65, ss 57, 58, 67; Race Relations Act 1976 (UK) (‘RRA(UK)’) c 74, ss 48, 
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the equality commissions have found it difficult to conduct investigations, particularly in the United 
States27 and Britain.28 Consequently, the equality commissions focused their resources on assisting 
individual complaints and conducting litigation. For this reason, investigations are not examined 
further in this article.29   
This section presents an overview of both the complaint resolution process and the equality 
commissions’ assistance function in the United States, Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland. In 
addition to this function, the equality commissions can appear as an amicus curiae or intervene in 
proceedings. These powers relate to the litigation stage and are not considered in detail in this article as 
the focus is on broader issues. It is acknowledged that the equality commissions could use their amicus 
curiae and intervention powers to accomplish some of the activities discussed in Part IV, such as 
developing the law. The experience of the overseas equality commissions shows that the amicus curiae 
and intervention powers are most effective when they are exercised as part of a program of strategic 
enforcement. However, it may be harder for the equality commission to achieve its strategic objectives 
this way because in a case in which it is a third party, the equality commission will have less control 
compared to when it assists the complainant. The equality issues may be peripheral to the matter, for 
example, or the equality commission may be required to frame its arguments around the issues raised 
by the parties. 
 
1    Individual Complaints 
In Ireland, discrimination complaints are lodged at the Equality Tribunal which resolves them through 
mediation or adjudication. The Equality Authority (‘IEA’) is not responsible for handling or resolving 
complaints. There are two equality commissions in the United Kingdom: the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (‘UKEHRC’) in Britain and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland 
                                                                                                                                            
49, 58; Disability Rights Commission Act 1999 (UK) (‘DRCA’) c 17, ss 3–5; Equality Act 2006 (UK) c 
3, s 20(2); Employment Equality Act 1998 (Ireland) Number 21/1998, ss 62–5. 
27 The USEEOC Commissioners can institute a Commissioner Charge of discrimination based on the 
Commission’s knowledge of inequality at a workplace obtained from individual complaints. The 
USEEOC then investigates the charge and if the investigation uncovers enough evidence to suggest 
that discrimination is occurring, the Commissioner can bring suit. Initially, the USEEOC used 
Commissioner Charges to investigate companies thought to be engaging in systemic race 
discrimination. Some of the country’s largest employers were investigated, namely Ford Motor 
Company, General Electric, General Motors and Sears, Roebuck & Co. However, due to its complaint 
handling responsibilities, which consumes most of its resources, the USEEOC has found it difficult to 
engage in enforcement activities. See further David L Rose, ‘Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We 
Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?’ (1989) 42 Vanderbilt Law Review 1121, 
1151 n 159. See also Julie Chi-hye Suk, ‘Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State’ [2006] 
University of Illinois Law Review 405, 440–4, 468. 
28 When it established the UKCRE and UKEOC, Parliament expected them to act, and to be seen to be 
acting, as law enforcement agencies. Investigations were expected to be the equality commissions’ 
main enforcement method. However, a series of judicial decisions subsequently scaled back their 
effectiveness and introduced cumbersome administrative procedures. Most famously, Lord Denning 
likened inquiries to the Inquisition: Science Research Council v Nasse [1979] 1 QB 144, 170. See also 
R v CRE; Ex parte London Borough of Hillingdon [1982] 3 WLR 159; UKCRE v Amari Plastics 
[1982] 2 WLR 972; Re Prestige Group plc [1984] 1 WLR 335. See also Catherine Barnard, ‘A 
European Litigation Strategy: The Case of the Equal Opportunities Commission’ in Jo Shaw and 
Gillian More (eds), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon Press, 1995) 258; Colm 
O’Cinneide, ‘The Commission for Equality and Human Rights: A New Institution for New and 
Uncertain Times’ (2007) 36 Industrial Law Journal 141; George Appleby and Evelyn Ellis, ‘Formal 
Investigations: The Commission for Racial Equality and the Equal Opportunities Commission as Law 
Enforcement Agencies’ [1984] Public Law 236. 
29 On investigations conducted by the British equality commissions, see, eg, Appleby and Ellis, above 
n 27; Alison Harvison Young, ‘Keeping the Courts at Bay: The Canadian Human Rights Commission 
and its Counterparts in Britain and Northern Ireland: Some Comparative Lessons’ (1993) 43 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 65, 95–125; O’Cinneide ibid, 148–9; Chi-hye Suk, above n 27 444 et seq; 
Aileen McColgan, Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Hart, 2nd ed, 2005) 357; Rupert 
Harwood, ‘Teeth and Their Use: Enforcement Action by the Three Equality Commissions’ (Report, 
Public Interest Research Unit, 2006). 
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(‘ECNI’). The complaint resolution process is substantially the same. Complainants have direct access 
to Employment Tribunals and to civil courts for non-employment related complaints. The equality 
commissions are not responsible for complaint handling or conciliation.30 In October 2007, the three 
British equality commissions — the Commission for Racial Equality (‘UKCRE’), the Equal 
Opportunities Commission (‘UKEOC’) and the Disability Rights Commission (‘UKDRC’) — were 
merged into one body, the UKEHRC, which is responsible for all prohibited forms of discrimination. 
The discussion of Britain herein refers predominantly to the UKEHRC’s predecessors and although it 
is historical, the information is still valuable because neither the role of the equality commission or the 
enforcement model were radically altered in 2007; the primary change was that the three existing 
equality commissions were amalgamated into the UKEHRC, and it assumed additional responsibility 
for human rights.31 The former equality commissions had up to four decades experience and each used 
the law and their enforcement functions in different ways with varying degrees of success, as discussed 
throughout the article. Interviews were conducted with key staff at the UKCRE and UKDRC 
immediately prior to the merger to gain an insight into how the equality commissions used their 
enforcement functions and to determine the value of introducing such an approach in Australia.  
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (‘USEEOC’) is the federal agency responsible for 
investigating complaints about employment discrimination in the United States.32 Like the Australian 
equality commissions, the USEEOC is a gatekeeper, so before a complainant can file a lawsuit in 
federal court they must file a ‘charge’ (a complaint) with the USEEOC. The role of the USEEOC is to 
investigate each charge. The Commission operates as a neutral fact-finder. If it finds that there is 
reasonable cause that discrimination has occurred, the USEEOC attempts to resolve the charge by 
conference, conciliation or persuasion.33 If the parties cannot reach agreement, the complainant can 
litigate.34   
 
2    Assisting Individual Complainants 
The equality commissions in the United Kingdom and Ireland can assist complainants with resolving 
their complaints.35 A complainant can contact the equality commission and, provided they meet certain 
                                                 
30 Parties can choose conciliation for an employment related complaint. Conciliation is conducted by a 
government agency — the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (‘ACAS’) in Britain and the 
Labour Relations Agency in Northern Ireland. See generally Keith Susson and John Taylor, ‘The 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service’ in Linda Dickens and Alan C. Neal (eds), The 
Changing Institutional Face of British Employment Relations (Kluwer Law, 2006) 25, 29. 
Complainants in a non-employment disability discrimination complaint could access an independent 
conciliation service between 2000–07: see also below n 69. In September 2007, the ECNI established a 
similar conciliation service for Northern Ireland: see Equality (Disability Etc)(Northern Ireland) Order 
2000 (NI) SR 2000/1110 art 12. The UKEHRC now provides a voluntary conciliation service.  
31 The UKEHRC has a wider range of enforcement powers at its disposal, such as compliance notices 
and an inquiry function. Thus, it has engaged in a different range of activities than its predecessors. It is 
outside the scope of this article to consider these activities further.  
32 The USEEOC enforces: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §2000e (1964); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 USC §633a (1967); Titles I and V of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 42 USC §§ 12101 (1990). Other federal institutions are responsible for 
non-employment based discrimination. For example, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of 
Justice is responsible for enforcing Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act which prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of disability in public accommodation. Most states also have laws 
prohibiting discrimination and a civil rights division within the executive to enforce these laws. See 
generally Lisa Guerin and Amy DelPo, The Essential Guide to Federal Employment Laws (NoLo, 
2009). 
33 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §2000e-5 (1964).  
34 See Jean R Sternlight, ‘In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment Discrimination 
Laws: A Comparative Analysis’ (2004) 78 Tulane Law Review 1401, 1402-3. 
35 SDA(UK) s 75(1); RRA(UK) s 66 (the UKCRE also partly funded a network of more than 80 local 
Race Equality Councils that could advise and assist race discrimination complainants); DRCA s 12; 
Race Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 (NI) SR 1997/869 art 64(7); Sex Discrimination 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1976 (UK) art 75; the Equality (Disability Etc) (Northern Ireland) Order 
2000 (NI) SR 2000/1110 art 9; Employment Equality Act 1998 (Ireland) Number 21/1998 s 67. The 
UKEHRC can also provide assistance: Equality Act 2006 (UK) c 3, s 28.  
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criteria, the equality commission may decide to assist them. For instance, under the Race Relations Act 
1976 (UK) (‘RRA(UK)’) ‘assistance’ includes offering advice, trying to procure a settlement, 
arranging for advice from a solicitor, and arranging legal representation.36 Since they do not play a part 
in complaint resolution, the United Kingdom and Irish equality commissions can assist complainants 
from the beginning of the process. 
The situation in the United States is different. Since it is a gatekeeper, the USEEOC cannot litigate a 
charge on behalf of a complainant until it has attempted to resolve the charge informally.37 If the 
parties cannot reach an agreement through ADR, the complainant can litigate, or the USEEOC may 
decide to litigate the charge on the complainant’s behalf. Therefore, the USEEOC’s assistance function 
applies only if ADR is unsuccessful and the complainant decides to litigate. The USEEOC can also 
litigate if the complainant settles the charge; because it acts in the public interest, it can bring an action 
which will benefit other people.38 Unlike the United Kingdom and Irish equality commissions, the 
USEEOC can assist a group of complainants.39  
 
C    Modifying the Australian Approach 
The overseas equality commissions considered in this article that have used their assistance function 
most successfully do not play a role in complaint handling or provide ADR.40 Without the 
responsibility for complaint handling or providing ADR, an equality commission can focus on 
enforcing the law, including through assisting complainants. Therefore, so that the Australian equality 
commissions can act as an advocate for the victims of discrimination, they should be divested of their 
complaint handling and conciliation functions. Either a separate agency41 or the court42 would assume 
these functions, thereby enabling the equality commissions to focus on strategic enforcement, including 
through assisting complainants. According to Hepple, this is why complaint handling was taken away 
from the British Race Relations Board (the UKCRE’s predecessor); so that the Board could take a 
broader, strategic approach to addressing discrimination, it was freed from resolving individual 
complaints.43  
Of course, it is possible simply to separate the equality commission’s complaint handling arm from its 
enforcement arm, which is the model used in the United States. Likewise, the equality commissions in 
Western Australia and South Australia currently have separate enforcement arms. However, these three 
equality commissions have used their assistance function to limited extent, especially in comparison to 
the overseas equality commissions that do not handle complaints, as the remainder of this article 
shows. This suggests that there is a causal link between an equality commission possessing complaint 
handling and enforcement functions, and it using the latter to a limited extent. One explanation for this 
is the resources consumed by complaint handling. During its existence, complaint handling has 
consumed most of the USEEOC’s resources, leaving insufficient funds for enforcement.44 A more 
                                                 
36 RRA(UK) s 66(2). 
37 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §2000e-5(f)(1) (1964). 
38 EEOC v Waffle House Inc, 534 US 279, 286 (2002). 
39 If a charge is not resolved and it relates to 20 complainants or less, the field office’s legal section will 
review it to determine whether it is a charge that is suitable for it to litigate using staff trial attorneys. 
For charges with a class of more than 20 harmed parties, the Commission must vote on whether or not 
to litigate: Interview with Lisa Sirkin, Supervisory Trial Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (New York City, 12 September 2007). An example is the Restaurant Daniel litigation, 
discussed in Part III. 
40 Compare the work of the UKDRC and ECNI with the USEEOC, for instance, as discussed in Part 
III. On the USEEOC, see below n 58. 
41 For example, in Britain, ACAS is responsible for the voluntary conciliation of employment related 
discrimination complaints. 
42For example, in Ireland, the Equality Tribunal offers complainants a choice of mediation or 
adjudication to resolve their complaint. In the industrial relations jurisdiction in Australia, the 
enforcement agency is not responsible for ADR or adjudication.  
43 Bob Hepple, ‘The Equality Commissions and the Future Commission for Equality and Human 
Rights’ in Linda Dickens and Alan C Neal (eds), The Changing Institutional Face of British 
Employment Relations (Kluwer Law, 2006) 101, 106. See also Christopher McCrudden, David J Smith 
and Colin Brown, Racial Justice at Work (Policies Study Institute, 1991) 15. 
44 See below n 58. 
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persuasive explanation is the conflict of interest in the equality commission taking a neutral position 
during the complaint handling and complaint resolution phases, and then playing an advocacy role 
once it decides to assist the complainant.45 This is not so much of a problem in the United States 
because the USEEOC does not assist the complainant until the complainant decides to litigate, by 
which time the Commission’s role as a neutral facilitator has ended. In the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, assistance is available once the complainant decides to lodge a complaint. This is the model 
recommended for Australia. It would be impractical for a member of staff to advise and assist the 
complainant, while another served as the Conciliator and attempted to resolve the complaint. 
Therefore, separating the functions within the same institution is not the preferred option. If the 
equality commission is not responsible for handling or conciliating complaints, there will be no 
expectation that it will behave neutrally. It can then assume an enforcement role without any conflict of 
interest.  
The remaining discussion concentrates on the assistance work conducted by the overseas equality 
commissions and argues that it is important to take a strategic approach to enforcement. Complainant 
assistance is an activity that most Australian legislatures have not contemplated to date. Since it is the 
key component of the overseas equality commissions’ enforcement work, it is worth examining in-
depth, particularly in light of the Commonwealth government’s current review of federal anti-
discrimination legislation.46  
 
D    Providing Assistance – Why Take A Strategic Approach 
The primary manner in which the overseas equality commissions enforce anti-discrimination law is by 
assisting complainants to resolve their discrimination complaint. The extent of the assistance provided 
depends on the circumstances of the case and the funding available. For example, the IEA grants 
assistance in stages, and reviews the level of assistance as the complaint progresses. Initially, 
complainants assisted by the IEA only receive advice and help with lodging their complaint at the 
Equality Tribunal. If the IEA determines that the case is worth pursuing, it will grant further assistance 
to represent the complainant at the Tribunal.47 The likelihood of success at hearing is part of this 
assessment. The IEA also considers the cost of proceedings, the backlog of cases, the resources 
available to the Authority and what the Tribunal is likely to order.48  
The equality commissions initially assisted complainants on an ad hoc basis. There are two main 
criticisms levelled at this type of approach: firstly, happening upon a landmark case is a matter of 
chance; and secondly, the equality commission can be consumed by such work and lose focus on wider 
objectives. After examining these criticisms, this section shows that they can be overcome by taking a 
strategic approach. It draws on the experience of the UKDRC, which successfully introduced a 
program of strategic enforcement of disability discrimination law. 
 
1    Criticisms of Providing Assistance on an Ad Hoc Basis 
The first criticism is that assistance on an ad hoc basis can end up being a lottery. Colm O’Cinneide, 
Lecturer at the Faculty of Laws, University College London, described this as a search for ‘a needle in 
a haystack’.49 By assisting complainants on an ad hoc basis, the equality commission must frame its 
strategy around the type of complaints brought to it. It is also unlikely that the equality commission 
will happen upon a landmark case using an ad hoc approach. 
The second criticism of assistance work is that it can easily become the equality commission’s main 
work, its ‘bread and butter’.50 The basis of this criticism is that focusing on assisting complainants on 
                                                 
45 See South Australian Government, above n 13. 
46 Robert McClelland, Attorney–General and Lindsay Tanner, Minister for Finance and Deregulation, 
‘Reform of Anti-Discrimination Legislation’ (Media Release, 21 April 2010). 
47 Interview with Carol Anne Woulfe, Solicitor, Equality Authority (Dublin, 26 September 2007). See 
also IEA, Annual Report 2006 (2007) Appendix 5.  
48 IEA, above n 46. See also IEA, Current Criteria for Section 67 Representation 
<http://www.equality.ie/index.asp?locID=14&docID=9>. 
49 Interview with Colm O’Cinneide, Lecturer, University College London (London, 15 September 
2007). 
50 O’Cinneide, above n 28, 150.  
9 
 
an ad hoc basis can stretch the equality commission’s resources and cause it to lose focus on its wider 
objectives,51 such as its educational, promotional and policy work.52 To minimise this problem, the 
UKCRE and USEEOC implemented a strategy of providing assistance to obtain the maximum benefit 
from their resources. In its early days, the UKCRE attempted to assist everyone who had an arguable 
case53 but from 2003, it required more than ‘arguability’ to provide assistance.54 The UKCRE changed 
its focus to cases that would clarify the law, affect a group or promote legislative change.55 The 
Commission regarded this approach as a more valuable use of its limited resources.56 Congress 
invested the USEEOC with the power to litigate on behalf of complainants in 1972.57 In doing this, the 
US Supreme Court said, Congress expected the USEEOC to bear ‘the primary burden of litigation’.58 
However, during its lifetime, the USEEOC has been preoccupied with its complaint handling 
responsibilities. Due to the resources this consumes, the USEEOC has been criticised for not being an 
enforcement agency.59 To address this, in 1996 it adopted a vision of strategic enforcement by 
implementing its National Enforcement Plan.60 The Plan introduced a strategy for the USEEOC’s 
enforcement role and defined criteria for selecting which charges to litigate.61 The purpose of this Plan 
is to ensure the most effective use of the USEEOC’s resources by directing funds to where they have 
the potential to yield the greatest results.62 The USEEOC’s enforcement priorities apply across its 
work, including its power to act as an amicus curiae.  
 
2    The Benefits of Taking a Strategic Approach 
An equality commission has limited resources. It is not possible for it to assist every meritorious case, 
so a certain degree of filtering is required anyway. However, rather than assisting complainants on an 
ad hoc basis, the equality commission can develop a strategy behind the assistance it provides. There 
                                                 
51 The British government was concerned that this would happen to the UKEOC. See quotes from its 
White Paper which preceded the introduction of the SDA(UK) and UKEOC, cited in Nick O’Brien, 
‘The GB Disability Rights Commission and Strategic Law Enforcement: Transcending the Common 
Law Mind’ in Anna Lawson and Caroline Gooding (eds), Disability Rights in Europe (Hart, 2005) 249, 
250. 
52 Ibid. See, for example, the variety of such work undertaken by the UKDRC in additional to assisting 
complainants. 
53 Hepple, above n 43, 110. 
54 UKCRE, 2003 Annual Report (2004) 19. 
55 Ibid. 
56 The UKCRE took on responsibility for the race equality duty at this time and part of its strategy was 
to test it. Its new Chair, Trevor Phillips, also preferred to concentrate resources on ‘softer’ approaches, 
such as developing codes of practice for industry and implementing the race equality duty: Hepple, 
above n 43, 110. 
57 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub L No 96–261, 86 Stat 103. 
58 General Telephone Co of The Northwest v EEOC 446 US 318, 326 (1980). 
59 The USEEOC has experienced large backlogs of charges, which was a record high of more than 100 
000 charges in 1995. For this reason it has been criticised for becoming a charge–handling agency 
rather than an enforcement one; Green contends that this is due also to the political nature both of the 
agency and of its funding: Michael Z Green, ‘Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 
35 years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation’ (2001) 105 Dickinson Law Review 
305, 309–10. See also Chi-hye Suk, above n 27, 468. Funding cuts have limited the USEEOC’s 
enforcement activities and forced it to focus on charge processing, something the USEEOC has also 
acknowledged: See USEEOC, US Equal Opportunity Commission National Enforcement Plan (1997) 
<http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/nep.cfm>. 
60 USEEOC, above n 58. It also implemented the Priority Charge Handling Procedure in 1995 to 
address the backlog of charges. See generally USEEOC Office of the General Counsel, ‘Introduction to 
Commission Policies’ in Regional Attorney’s Manual (April 2005) 
<http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/manual/>; Paul M Igasaki and Paul Steven Miller, Priority 
Charge Handling Task Force Litigation Task Force (Report, USEEOC, 1998) VI; Theodore J St 
Antoine, ‘Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in 
Disguise?’ (1998) 15 TM Cooley Law Review 3, 8. 
61 Local Field Offices produce Local Enforcement Plans, which are consistent with the National Plan 
and directed at the needs of the local community: USEEOC, above n 59, I. 
62 Ibid II. 
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should be a reason for the equality commission to select certain complaints rather than, in Nick 
O’Brien’s words, get ‘every drop of justice from the orange’.63  
The UKDRC offers an example of successfully using what is termed ‘strategic enforcement’.64 As the 
‘youngest’ of the British equality commissions, the UKDRC benefited from assessing the successes 
and failures of the older commissions and taking them into account when it developed a strategic 
approach to enforcement.65 Reflecting on the UKDRC’s work five years into its operation, the 
Commission’s Director of Legal Services, Nick O’Brien, summarised the importance of taking a 
strategic approach: 
The aspiration, in the provision of legal services, must be that every case really counts as a 
significant contribution to the broader strategic agenda. By targeting particular groups, sectors 
or issues, by seeking clarification of technical obscurities in the higher appellate courts, and by 
intervening in public law actions that lie at the edge of, or even outside, the primary legislation 
of which the commission is custodian, an equality commission can bring an extra, and 
invaluable, ‘public interest’ dimension to the pursuit of litigation.66 
The UKDRC’s experience offers an informative example of how an equality commission which is not 
a gatekeeper for complaints can still access suitable complaints and implement its enforcement 
strategy.67 The UKDRC established a phone advice line for complainants68 and for complainants in 
non-employment related matters who sought a referral to conciliation.69 The helpline became a source 
of strategic complaints. Nick O’Brien said that the UKDRC tried to catch the ‘good complaints’ before 
they were referred to conciliation70 — once the issues raised in the complaint were defined, the 
Commission determined whether it could serve as a test case. If not, the complaint was referred to 
conciliation.71 The UKDRC also accessed complaints through other people and organisations working 
                                                 
63 Interview with Nick O’Brien, Director of Legal Services, Disability Rights Commission (Phone 
Interview, London, 21 September 2007).  
64 The academics the author interviewed in the United Kingdom praised the UKDRC and its success in 
this area. See also opinions of commentators in the UKDRC’s final publication: see, eg Michael 
Rubenstein, ‘Why the DRC’s Legal Strategy Succeeded’ in UKDRC, DRC Legal Achievements: 2000–
2007 (Legal Bulletin Issue 12, Legacy Edition, 2007) 11. See also the external recognition the UKDRC 
received: Agnes Fletcher and Nick O’Brien, ‘Disability Rights Commission: From Civil Rights to 
Social Rights’ (2008) 35 Journal of Law and Society 520, 534 n 58. 
65 The UKEOC did not begin with a litigation strategy. In its first years, its approach was ad hoc and 
cases were assisted if their potential to deliver broader change was recognised: Barnard, above n 28, 
263. By the mid 1980s, coinciding with the advent of the Conservative government, it started taking a 
strategic approach to the cases it assisted, as discussed in Part III. 
66 O’Brien, ‘The GB Disability Rights Commission’, above n 51, 253–4. On the UKDRC’s strategy see 
also Nick O’Brien and Caroline Gooding, ‘Final Reflections’ in UKDRC, DRC Legal Achievements: 
2000–2007 (Legal Bulletin Issue 12, Legacy Edition, 2007) 151, 152; UKDRC, ‘Securing Legal Rights 
in Practice for Disabled People’ (Legal Bulletin, December 2001) 3 <http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-
studies/archiveuk/DRC/Legal%20Bulletin%20Issue%201.pdf>; Pauline Hughes, ‘Intervention — An 
Exciting Tool for Tackling Discrimination’ (Legal Commentary, UKDRC, 1 February 2005). 
67 Cf the UKEOC which was not as proactive. As at 1995, the UKEOC had not advertised for any 
suitable cases; it relied on potential complainants to approach it: Barnard, above n 28, 271. 
68 The helpline took approximately 100 000 calls each year: Nick O’Brien, ‘“Accentuating the 
Positive”: Disability Rights and the Idea of a Commission for Equality and Human Rights’ (Speech 
delivered at the Industrial Law Society, St Catherine’s College, Oxford, 10 September 2004) 
<http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/DRC/speeches%2020042.pdf>. The UKDRC was 
not the only one to operate an advice line. The UKCRE operated an information and assistance phone 
line and the ECNI has a phone advice line for individuals. Complainants seeking assistance from the 
IEA can write to it or they are referred to its legal section having sought information from its Public 
Information Centre.  
69 Unlike the older British equality commissions, the UKDRC’s founding legislation empowered it to 
make arrangements for the provision of conciliation for complaints about goods, facilities and services, 
and education: DRCA s 10 amending Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) c 50, s 28. 
Complainants could only utilise conciliation if the UKDRC referred them. 
70 Interview with Nick O’Brien, Director of Legal Services, Disability Rights Commission (Phone 
Interview, London, 21 September 2007).  
71 Ibid. 
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in the area. When the UKDRC developed its strategic approach to enforcing the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 (UK) (‘DDA(UK)’) it sought assistance from lobbyists and lawyers to 
determine the type of litigation to become involved in. In turn, they referred complaints which suited 
this strategy to the UKDRC. Other sources of relevant complaints were NGOs and public interest 
groups. Lawyers also brought appeal cases to the UKDRC and if they fitted the strategy, the UKDRC 
would fund them.72 By actively seeking suitable complaints, the UKDRC could match appropriate 
complaints to its strategy, rather than having to frame the strategy around the complaints brought to it.  
A strategic approach overcomes the two criticisms levelled at assistance work, as described above. 
Rather than responding to the complaints brought to the equality commission’s attention on an ad hoc 
basis, the commission uses its established strategy as a guide for choosing appropriate complaints to 
assist and channelling its resources in the most effective way. As the examples in Part III show, the 
overseas equality commissions use their assistance function as part of a multi-pronged strategy to 
change and develop the law. For instance, the UKEOC and UKDRC decided the aspects of the law that 
they wanted to challenge and develop. From this, they determined the type of complaints they needed 
to access to achieve this.73 As part of a strategic approach, it is therefore important for the equality 
commission to identify legal battlefields and evaluate and update them regularly to ensure that it is 
fighting discrimination on the most relevant fronts. 
 
III    THE USE MADE OF ASSISTED COMPLAINTS 
The criteria used by the overseas equality commissions to decide which complaints to assist are 
summarised as complaints that: may result in a decision that will affect more than the individual 
complainant and apply to the group in question;74 are about areas of the law that require clarification 
from a higher court;75 may encourage the legislature to amend the law;76 are on appeal and fall within 
the overall strategy;77 highlight topical issues of concern to a group;78 or maintain the law’s profile and 
show that the law is being used and enforced.79 What is common to each criterion is that the equality 
commissions seek complaints that will have an impact beyond the individual. By generating an 
outcome that affects a group or by changing the law, the equality commissions use their assistance 
work for maximum impact. Part III presents examples of how the overseas equality commissions have 
used assisted complaints to achieve different ends.80 The purpose of each example is to illustrate that 
the equality commission’s involvement contributed to developing the law and helped to secure an 
outcome which benefited the wider community, not only the individual. Based on these examples, Part 
IV proposes why it would be valuable for the Australian equality commissions to assist complainants 
in a strategic way. 
 
A    Developing the Law through Strategic Litigation 
1    The UKEOC’s European Litigation 
                                                 
72 Ibid. The UKEOC did the same when it needed cases to take to the European Court of Justice, as 
discussed in Part III. The UKEOC advertised in trade journals, seeking complaints that fitted its 
litigation strategy: Karen J Alter and Jeannette Vargas, ‘Explaining Variation in the Use of European 
Litigation Strategies: European Community Law and British Gender Equality Policy’ (2000) 33 
Comparative Political Studies 452, 463. 
73 See further discussion in Part III. 
74 Eg the UKCRE, above n 55, and the USEEOC, above n 59, III. 
75 The UKCRE could provide assistance ‘if the complaint raised a question of principle or if it was 
unreasonable to expect the complainant to deal with it on their own due to its complexity, their position 
in relation to the respondent, or any other special consideration’. RRA(UK) s 66(1)(b). SDA(UK) s 
71(1) is the same, as is the ECNI’s policy: ECNI, ‘Policy for the Provision of Legal Advice and 
Assistance’ (Policy Document, June 2010), 2–4.  
76 Eg the UKCRE, above n 55. See also the discussion of the UKEOC in Part III.  
77 See discussion of the UKDRC in Part III. 
78 See discussion of the UKDRC in Part III. 
79 See discussion of the ECNI in Part III. 
80 It is acknowledged that the equality commissions do not rely solely on litigation to change the law or 
achieve outcomes that benefit groups. Assistance work is part of a multi-pronged strategy, which 
includes lobbying the government to change the law. 
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Through its assistance work, the UKEOC played a key role in developing British anti-discrimination 
law. The UKEOC was most successful at doing this during the era of the Conservative Thatcher and 
Major governments81 when it was faced with a government hostile to its agenda and to the 
development of gender equality laws.82 Initially, the UKEOC engaged in lobbying the government. For 
example, it attempted to persuade the government to raise the ceiling on compensation awards in sex 
discrimination complaints.83 After years of lobbying failed, the UKEOC helped fund an appropriate 
case to change this law, which ultimately reached the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’).84 The 
UKEOC’s approach was to begin with a domestic litigation strategy and appeal unfavourable court 
decisions. If that was unsuccessful, the Commission would ask domestic courts to refer adverse 
decisions to the ECJ.85 By 1995, the UKEOC and the then Northern Ireland Equal Opportunities 
Commission had funded 15 cases to the ECJ, which constituted one third of all references that the 
Court heard on equal pay and equal treatment in employment.86 The UKEOC’s strategy resulted in a 
number of landmark decisions, including removing the ceiling on compensation orders in sex 
discrimination complaints87 and shifting the burden of proof to employers once the employee had 
established a difference in the rate of pay for two jobs of equal value.88 The UKEOC then introduced 
the decisions into British law by supporting domestic cases relying upon the ECJ’s decisions89 or using 
European Law to strike down domestic law through judicial review proceedings.90 If a decision meant 
that the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (UK) (‘SDA(UK)’) had to be changed, lobbyists would attempt to 
persuade the government to amend the RRA(UK) as well.91 Drawing upon the UKEOC’s success, trade 
unions mounted a similar litigation strategy,92 as did public interest lawyers, interest groups and law 
centres.93 
 
2    Strategic Enforcement by the UKDRC 
The UKDRC is an example of an equality commission that successfully engaged in ‘strategic 
enforcement’.94 By the time the UKDRC was established, disability discrimination legislation had been 
in operation in Britain for five years.95 This meant that the UKDRC could evaluate the stage of 
                                                 
81 Alter and Vargas describe the actors committed to gender equality in the country at that time as part 
of ‘perhaps the most famous EC litigation success story’: Alter and Vargas, above n 72, 454. 
82 Ibid. The British government also sought to prevent further measures relating to equal treatment 
from being enacted at the European Union level during this time. See Linda Dickens, ‘Beyond the 
Business Case: A Three-Pronged Approach to Equality Action’ (1999) 9(1) Human Resources 
Management Journal 9, 11–12. 
83 Alter and Vargas, above n 72, 463. 
84 Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority (C-271/91) [1993] ECR 
I-4367. 
85 Any British court can send the ECJ a question and its decisions bind both the British and other 
European legal systems. It is acknowledged that the Australian equality commissions cannot duplicate 
this approach because Australia does not have an equivalent regional judicial body but this approach 
could be emulated by appealing cases to the High Court. See Part IV below.   
86 Barnard, above n 28, 254. Gay Moon said, ‘at the time, we [Britain] got a reputation in Europe for 
taking discrimination cases, whereas other countries had reputations for taking tax cases’: Interview 
with Gay Moon, Head of the Equalities Project, JUSTICE (London, 18 September 2007). 
87 Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority (C-271/91) [1993] ECR 
I-4367. 
88 Enderby v Frenchay Area Health Authority (C-127/92) [1993] ECR I-5535.  
89 ECJ decisions are unenforceable in British law. Enforcement by a domestic court is the only method 
of obtaining compliance: Alter and Vargas, above n 72, 460.  
90 Eg R v Secretary of State for Employment; Ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1995] 1 AC 1 
(HL) which relied on the ECJ’s strict standard of ‘justification’ in Bilka-Kaufhaus v Weber von Hartz 
(Case 170/84) [1986] ECR 160 to strike down an indirectly discriminatory workplace policy. Barnard 
provides other examples: see Barnard, above n 28, 264–6. 
91 Moon, above n 86. 
92 Alter and Vargas, above n 72, 458–60. 
93 Moon, above n 86. 
94 See text accompanying n 64. 
95 The DDA(UK) was enacted in 1995 without an enforcement body, partly due to the hostility the two 
existing equality commissions had encountered. In 1997, the Blair Labour government was elected and 
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development of the law, ascertain what parts of the legislation were not being used and determine 
which aspects needed to be clarified and what principles it wanted to test in higher courts.96 For 
example, when the UKDRC was established, the law was being used in the area of employment, 
primarily because there was an established system for conciliating and hearing such matters,97 but there 
was less use of the law in the area of goods, facilities and services.98 The UKDRC’s strategy included 
developing the law in these under–utilised areas.99 Within its first three years of operation, the UKDRC 
had assisted 164 cases and 56 of them related to goods, facilities and services.100 
The UKDRC saw itself as a ‘guardian’ of the DDA(UK)101 and thought it was therefore important that 
it was not associated with any ‘bad cases’102 — those that may be lost at first instance or which may 
develop the law in an unhelpful way.103 The UKDRC sought to challenge damaging decisions and 
moderate the impact of the law.104 The UKDRC also pioneered the approach of an equality commission 
intervening in litigation in Britain,105 but it used its intervention function sparingly, as one component 
of its overall strategy.106 The UKDRC intervened in cases that highlighted an issue relevant to the 
disabled community and when it could ‘bring an added dimension to the issues in question which the 
parties cannot’.107  
 
B    Obtaining Wider Remedies 
The equality commission’s involvement in a case often means it can negotiate a remedy that benefits 
other members of the community, not just the individual complainant. For example, when the IEA 
assists a complainant, it seeks an order requiring the respondent to change their practices or policies. 
To fulfil its mandate of fighting discrimination the IEA sees it as necessary to obtain an outcome which 
                                                                                                                                            
art 13 of the European Commission Treaty was introduced, both of which changed the political 
environment and paved the way for the UKDRC to be established. See generally Tufyal Choudhury, 
‘The Commission for Equality and Human Rights: Designing the Big Tent’ (2006) 13 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 311, 311–2. 
96 Interview with Nick O’Brien, Director of Legal Services, Disability Rights Commission (Phone 
Interview, London, 21 September 2007)..See also O’Brien, ‘The GB Disability Rights Commission’, 
above n 51, 251 et seq. 
97 ACAS and the Employment Tribunals respectively. Non-employment discrimination complaints are 
dealt with by the County Courts in England and Wales and the Sheriff Court in Scotland.  
98 In the first 19 months that the DDA(UK) was operative, only nine cases came before the County 
Courts: Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2002) 169. The reasons for 
this include that these courts are costly, procedurally complex and damages are low: Sandhya Drew, 
‘The DDA and Lawyers: DDA Representation and Advice Project’ in UKDRC, DRC Legal 
Achievements: 2000–2007 (Legal Bulletin Issue 12, Legacy Edition, 2007) 74, 76. 
99 Interview with Nick O’Brien, Director of Legal Services, Disability Rights Commission (Phone 
Interview, London, 21 September 2007). See also O’Brien, ‘Accentuating the Positive’, above n 68. 
Establishing a conciliation service for these complaints also contributed to increased use of this part of 
the legislation.  
100 O’Brien, ‘The GB Disability Rights Commission’, above n 51, 252. 
101 Rubenstein, above n 64, 12. 
102 Interview with Nick O’Brien, Director of Legal Services, Disability Rights Commission (Phone 
Interview, London, 21 September 2007). .. 
103 Cases which would potentially set an ‘unfortunate’ precedent in the disability rights jurisdiction 
were sent to conciliation so that the complainant could still receive redress: Margaret Doyle, 
‘Enforcing Rights Through Mediation’ in UKDRC, DRC Legal Achievements: 2000–2007 (Legal 
Bulletin Issue 12, Legacy Edition, 2007) 57, 59. 
104 See, eg, below IV(D) for a discussion of Jones v The Post Office (2001) IRLR 384. 
105 Rubenstein, above n 64, 12. 
106 See eg the UKDRC’s intervention as a third party in The Queen (On the Application of (1)A (2) B v 
East Sussex County Council [2002] EWHC 2771 (Admin). 
107 Hughes, above n 66. The assistance of the UKDRC in providing the court with expertise was noted 
for example by Munby J in Burke v The General Medical Council [2004] EWCA Civ 1879 (Admin) 
[34]. 
14 
 
has an impact beyond compensating the individual.108 The ECNI has a similar approach, as discussed 
below. 
When the USEEOC litigates a charge on behalf of a complainant, it is considered to be acting in the 
public interest, so the Commission will not agree to keep the matter confidential and it seeks wide 
remedies. If the USEEOC settles a charge, it insists on doing so with a consent decree. This is a public 
document, filed in federal court and the court retains jurisdiction. The terms of the consent decree vary 
depending on the circumstances of the complaint. The USEEOC usually seeks employee training on 
equal opportunity laws and requires employers to develop an equal opportunity policy. If one exists, 
the USEEOC will review it and ensure that the policy is distributed to all employees. The Commission 
seeks a requirement that the USEEOC’s posters are displayed in the workplace, along with a notice that 
the lawsuit was settled. It may also seek a monitoring role and require the employer to report to the 
Commission or regularly provide it with information, such as hiring data.109 The USEEOC publicises 
the terms of the consent decree by issuing a media release for all charges it files and settles.110 It sees 
publicity as playing an important part in educating potential complainants and other employers.111 
A well publicised112 example from the USEEOC’s New York District Office was a charge it filed 
against a well-known Manhattan restaurant, Restaurant Daniel.113 The charge arose as part of the 
USEEOC’s inquiry into systemic discrimination in the restaurant industry: ‘white’ employees were 
primarily working in the ‘front of house’ as hosts and waiters (which are better paid positions), while 
‘people of colour’ were predominantly working in the ‘back of house’, working as ‘bussers’ and 
washing dishes.114 In the complaint against Restaurant Daniel, the USEEOC litigated on behalf of eight 
Hispanic and Bangladeshi ‘back of house’ staff who claimed that they were discriminated against in 
their job assignments on the basis of national origin, and that they were victimised.115 The charge was 
settled with a consent decree in force for seven years, an unusually long term,116 which required the 
respondent restaurant to pay the complainants US$80 000. The respondent was also required to: refrain 
from discriminating against an employee; distribute a non-discrimination policy; train its managers in 
federal equal opportunity law; display the USEEOC’s posters and a remedial notice (as prescribed in 
the decree)117 in prominent places, such as where employee notices are posted; and allow the USEEOC 
to monitor and review its compliance with the consent decree by inspecting records or interviewing its 
employees.118  
 
C    “Delivering Equality on the Ground” 
The ECNI is an interesting example of two aspects of assistance work: the ECNI assists general 
complaints as well as strategic ones; and, through its terms and conditions for providing assistance, it is 
able to secure outcomes that benefit other members of the community.  
 
                                                 
108 Interview with Carol Anne Woulfe, Solicitor, Equality Authority (Dublin, 26 September 2007). 
109 Interview with Lisa Sirkin, Supervisory Trial Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (New York City, 12 September 2007).  
110 See USEEOC, US EEOC Press Releases FY 2010, <www.eeoc.gov/press/>.  
111 Interview with Lisa Sirkin, Supervisory Trial Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (New York City, 12 September 2007).  
112 See, eg, Adam B Ellick, ‘Boulud Settling Suit Alleging Bias at a French Restaurant’, The New York 
Times (New York) 31 July 2007, Metropolitan Desk, 3. 
113 EEOC v Restaurant Daniel, No. 07-6845 (SDNY, 2 August 2007). 
114 Interview with Lisa Sirkin, Supervisory Trial Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (New York City, 12 September 2007).  
115 USEEOC New York District Office, ‘Manhattan Restaurant to Settle EEOC National Origin Bias 
Suit’ (Media Release, 31 July 2007).  
116 In this instance, it was difficult for the respondent to negotiate as the New York Attorney–General 
was also investigating it, so it was in the respondent’s interest to settle both claims simultaneously. 
117 Prescribed in ‘Exhibit B’ of the Consent Decree: EEOC v The 65th Street Restaurant LLC d/b/a/ 
Restaurant Daniel, and the Dinex Group (2007) United State District Court Southern District of New 
York, Civil Action No 07CIV6845, 
<http://www.ag.ny.gov/bureaus/civil_rights/pdfs/Restaurant%20Daniel%20AOD%207-25-07.pdf>. 
118 Ibid. 
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1    General and Strategic Complaints 
The ECNI chooses to assist strategic complaints and straightforward ones, which are not legally 
uncertain,119 because it believes this approach is ‘delivering equality on the ground’.120 Mary Kitson, 
Senior Legal Officer at the ECNI, said that through its assistance work, the Commission attempts to 
maintain a balance between testing and clarifying new grounds of discrimination, such as age and 
disability, and maintaining the profile of the older ones, such as pregnancy and religious 
discrimination.  
The ECNI’s ability to assist general and strategic complaints is due to its comparatively large budget 
and the considerable resources it commits to enforcement.121 The greater resources available to the 
ECNI are evident when its budget, staffing numbers and population are compared with a similar 
equality commission, the IEA.122 In the 2006–07 financial year, the ECNI’s budget was approximately 
€8.7 million,123 whereas the IEA’s 2007 budget was €5.6 million.124 Therefore, the ECNI’s budget was 
50 per cent more than the IEA’s. The ECNI also had greater staffing resources over that period: it had 
139 staff,125 while the IEA had 51.126 The ECNI deals with a much smaller population,127 but it has a 
lot more resources to devote to them: the ECNI has approximately €4.02 per head of population, while 
the IEA has approximately €1.32.128 The comparatively greater resources at the ECNI’s disposal means 
not only can it concentrate on general complaints as well as strategic ones, it can assist a greater 
proportion of complainants than its counterparts: one in four complainants who apply for assistance 
                                                 
119 Some of the things the ECNI considers when deciding to grant assistance were noted at above n 74. 
It also considers the extent to which the complaint fits in with the Commission’s strategic objectives, 
and whether; is likely to raise public awareness; will have a significant impact; has the potential for 
follow-up by the Commission; and the cost of assistance is commensurate with the benefits to be 
gained: ECNI, above n 75, 3. 
120 Interview with Mary Kitson, Senior Legal Officer, Equality Commission for Northern Ireland 
(Belfast, 25 September 2007). There may have been less need for the ECNI to appeal uncertain cases to 
higher courts because the three British equality commissions were actively engaged in doing this and 
any decisions from higher courts affected the law in Northern Ireland. Quinlivan also says that for Irish 
anti-discrimination law to be effective, the IEA should take ‘a steady run of cases’ not just exceptional 
ones but this is not currently possible due to the IEA’s workload: Shivaun Quinlivan, ‘Report on 
Measures to Combat Discrimination — Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC’ (Country Report: 
Ireland, 2007) 61. In late 2008, the IEA was subject to severe funding cuts. See below n 127. 
121 This is due to the political circumstances in Northern Ireland which led to its creation, primarily the 
systemic discrimination suffered by the Catholic population. On its approach, Mary Kitson said ‘we 
think because we’re such a small jurisdiction, we’ve had so much historical problems with equality, it’s 
really important that that message gets out there’: Interview with Mary Kitson, Senior Legal Officer, 
Equality Commission for Northern Ireland (Belfast, 25 September 2007).  
122 It is difficult to draw comparisons with the resources of the British equality commissions because 
they only dealt with one ground of discrimination and were responsible for a larger population. Further, 
their budgets were not equal; in their final years, the budgets of the UKDRC and UKCRE were twice 
that of the UKEOC: O’Cinneide, above n 28, 144 n 7. 
123 Based on the exchange rate of 1.2431 (as at 29 August 2008).The ECNI’s budget was £6 998 798: 
ECNI, Annual Report & Accounts 2006–2007 (2008) 62. 
124 See budget estimates in Quinlivan, above n 120, 67; Judy Walsh et al, ‘Enabling Lesbian, Gay and 
Bisexual Individuals to Access Their Rights under Equality Law’ (Report, ECNI and The Equality 
Authority, November 2007). 
125ECNI, above n 123 49. 
126 IEA, Annual Report, above n 47, 100; Quinlivan, ibid 67. 
127 The population of Ireland is two and a half times the size of Northern Ireland. As at 2006, the 
population of Ireland was estimated at 4 239 848: Central Statistics Office Ireland, Statistics 
<http://www.cso.ie/statistics/Population1901-2006.htm>. As at 2006, the population of Northern 
Ireland was estimated at 1 741 619: Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Population 
Statistics <http://www.nisra.gov.uk/demography/default.asp3.htm>. 
128 In late 2008, the Irish government announced budget cuts of up to 43 per cent and the IEA’s CEO, 
Niall Crowley, resigned in protest: Carol Coulter, ‘Equality Authority Chief Resigns Over Budget 
Cutbacks’, The Irish Times (Dublin) 12 December 2008. He was followed by six board members: 
Anne-Marie Walsh, ‘Five Resign From Board of Equality Watchdog’ Independent (Ireland) 20 January 
2009. 
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from the ECNI receive it.129 This is in stark contrast to the UKCRE, for instance, which assisted only 
3.2 per cent of the employment complainants who applied for assistance in 2003.130 
 
2    Securing Wider Outcomes 
The ECNI attempts to secure wider outcomes through its assistance work. To receive assistance, 
complainants must agree to two conditions.131 First, the complainant cannot settle the complaint 
confidentially. This is so that the ECNI can publicise the settlement. The ECNI publishes names and 
facts of complaints in its annual settlements publication132 and issues media releases upon settling a 
case.133 The ECNI’s aim is to raise awareness amongst the public and to highlight issues and 
outcomes.134 Second, the complainant cannot settle the matter without the ECNI, and by extension the 
community, getting something out of it. For example, as part of the settlement of an employment 
discrimination complaint, the employer will be required to meet with the ECNI’s Employment 
Development Division135 within 12 weeks of the agreement to review their practices and procedures, 
change them if necessary and train their managers accordingly.136 The terms of settlement will be made 
public. Mary Kitson said respondents can alleviate any negative publicity by informing the public that 
they are working with the ECNI to ensure that the situation does not arise again. On the rare occasions 
that the respondent fails to take the required action, the ECNI can sue.137 Through this strategy the 
complainant receives compensation, while the ECNI negotiates something that will benefit a wider 
group and which delivers equality ‘on the ground’.  
 
IV    THE VALUE OF THE EQUALITY COMMISSION ASSISTING 
COMPLAINANTS 
The Australian equality commissions are predominantly concerned with complaint handling and 
conciliation. The majority cannot advise and assist complainants; those that can assist complainants do 
so to a limited extent. It is curious that most Australian legislatures chose not to invest the equality 
commissions with an assistance function, especially since this model was operating elsewhere when the 
Australian equality commissions were created.138 One reason for the legislatures’ hesitation could be 
the potential conflict of interest. Since all of the Australian equality commissions have a conciliation 
function, there is a potential conflict of interest if the equality commission can advise the complainant 
and it is required to facilitate conciliation. The South Australian government’s comments support 
                                                 
129 Interview with Mary Kitson, Senior Legal Officer, Equality Commission for Northern Ireland 
(Belfast, 25 September 2007). The ECNI’s budget for assistance was £270 903 in 2006–07: ECNI, 
Annual Report, above n 123, 77. 
130 The UKCRE received 1130 requests for assistance, constituting about 36 per cent of all race 
discrimination complaints. It granted full assistance to 28, limited assistance to nine, and no assistance 
to 1093: Hepple, above n 43, 109. 
131 Interview with Mary Kitson, Senior Legal Officer, Equality Commission for Northern Ireland 
(Belfast, 25 September 2007). Both are part of the ECNI’s terms and conditions for providing 
assistance. 
132 See, eg, ECNI, Decisions and Settlements Review 2005–2006 (2006). 
133 See, eg, ECNI, ‘Settlement Allows Woman Back to Work in Belfast’ (Media Release, 9 May 2008). 
134ECNI, Complaint Assistance 
<http://www.equalityni.org/sections/default.asp?cms=your%20rights_complainant%20assistance  
 &cmsid=2_417&id=417&secid=2>. 
135This Division is ‘responsible for the provision of equality support to employers. The Division aims 
to ensure that employers are facilitated to comply with equality legislation and that best practice is 
promoted’: ibid. Its services are not means tested so any employer can obtain advice: Interview with 
Mary Kitson, Senior Legal Officer, Equality Commission for Northern Ireland (Belfast, 25 September 
2007). 
136 Interview with Mary Kitson, Senior Legal Officer, Equality Commission for Northern Ireland 
(Belfast, 25 September 2007).  
137 Mary Kitson described an instance of a wheelchair user who was unable to access a shop and the 
retailer agreed to provide such facilities as part of the settlement. When it failed to do so, the ECNI 
sued. This emphasised the importance of the agreement: ibid. 
138 The UKCRE replaced the Race Relations Board in 1976, so it pre-dates all of the Australian 
equality commissions. The UKCRE could assist complainants: see above n 35.  
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this.139 For the purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to explain the legislatures’ behaviour 
conclusively. If the equality commissions are divested of their complaint handling and conciliation 
functions (and they are assumed by the tribunal or another institution), any potential conflict ceases to 
be a concern. This would mean that the equality commissions would be free to act as an advocate for 
the law and advise and assist complainants without any expectation that they will act impartially. 
By investing the equality commission with an enforcement role, Dickens says that the state is 
indicating the importance of eliminating discrimination. The state is signifying that addressing 
discrimination is not solely the concern of the individual parties; it is in the public’s interest too.140 
Based on the experience of the equality commissions in other countries, Part IV proposes five reasons 
it would be valuable for the Australian equality commissions to assist complainants and have a visible 
enforcement role: increasing access to justice; developing the law; maintaining the law’s profile; 
increasing the threat of litigation; and so that the equality commissions become ‘repeat players’. This is 
followed by an examination of some shortcomings of this type of work. 
 
A    Increasing Access to Justice 
A person bringing a discrimination complaint in Australia faces many obstacles, such as cost and 
requiring legal advice to help them to navigate complex law and unfamiliar judicial procedures. It is 
because of these obstacles that many complainants choose to settle. Indeed, ADR is offered so that 
people can access justice but avoid dealing with the formal legal system and its complexities. By 
providing assistance, the equality commission could start to address some of these obstacles. The 
equality commission’s assistance would increase access to justice by decreasing the financial burden 
on the complainants it assists and providing them with support.141 For example, the UKDRC chose to 
assist the most disadvantaged disabled people who were least likely to have access to justice and be 
able to enforce their rights.142  
Like the Australian equality commissions, the overseas equality commissions also provide general, 
informal advice about the law in response to inquiries.143 However, it is their ability to provide 
informed advice, rather than general information, which is necessary for increasing access to justice. 
Graham O’Neill, Senior Legal Policy Officer at the UKCRE, distinguished between the UKCRE 
offering general information about the law on its website and over the phone and providing a 
complainant with informed advice about the merits of their complainant. He thought that having access 
to informed advice from the Commission had increased access to justice for race discrimination 
complainants.144 However, by providing assistance, an equality commission should not assume the role 
of a law centre or Legal Aid provider.145 Nor should its assistance be regarded as a substitute for the 
public provision of legal funding.146 The equality commission must retain its strategic approach. 
Instead, the value of the equality commission taking on an assistance role is that it opens up another 
                                                 
139 See above n 13. 
140 Dickens, above n 2, 475. 
141 Bob Ross, a complainant assisted by the UKDRC, said that he could not have pursued his case 
without the UKDRC’s support due to the cost: Bob Ross, ‘A Claimant’s Perspective: Ross v Ryanair 
Ltd and Stansted Airport Ltd’ in UKDRC, DRC Legal Achievements: 2000–2007 (Legal Bulletin Issue 
12, Legacy Edition, 2007) 31, 32. 
142 O’Brien refers to nine cases brought on behalf of people with learning difficulties and mental 
illness: O’Brien, ‘The GB Disability Rights Commission’, above n 51, 254. 
143 See above n 68. 
144 Interview with Graham O’Neill, Senior Legal Policy Officer, Commission for Racial Equality 
(London, 18 September 2007). See also comments by the UKCRE that changes to the provision of 
public legal aid which would mean lawyers could only spend five hours on a discrimination complaint 
is inadequate. Due to the complex nature of the law, a complaint requires specialist expertise: UKCRE, 
Response to the Discrimination Law Review (2007), 25-27. 
145 See further O’Brien, ‘Accentuating the Positive’, above n 68. 
146 There is still a need for increased legal funding for discrimination complaints, particularly as they 
are likely to be lodged by members of marginalised groups who are unlikely to have access to legal 
support, but this is not the role for an equality commission per se. The UKCRE, for instance, partly 
funded a network of Race Equality Councils who could also assist complainants. These Councils were 
local bodies that the UKCRE referred complainants to but they were separate from the UKCRE.  
18 
 
avenue for complainants in this area of law, which, at present, offers complainants little financial 
support.147  
 
B    Developing the Law 
Discrimination has been prohibited in Australia for over 30 years, yet a relatively small body of case 
law has developed in this time. The reason for this is that the vast majority of discrimination 
complaints settle or they are withdrawn prior to hearing so the courts have had limited opportunities to 
apply and interpret the legislation.148 For the purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to examine 
the reasons for this, only to recognise that the result is there are aspects of anti-discrimination law that 
the courts have not considered.  
Anti-discrimination law is a relatively new area of law and its principles are still evolving. It is based 
on statutory rights, so it is not supported by a well-developed body of common law like ‘older’ areas, 
such as tort or equity. Guidance about the law’s application comes from the statutes and their 
interpretation. Courts have had limited opportunities to provide this guidance over the last three 
decades, particularly the superior courts. The High Court has not considered the Sex Discrimination Act 
1984 (Cth), for example, nor has it considered age discrimination. Indeed, in the slightly more than 30 
years that Australian law has prohibited discrimination, the High Court has substantively considered 
the legislation on only seven occasions.149 Most of these decisions relate to disability discrimination.150 
Only one involved race discrimination151 and there is only one authoritative decision about the 
application of special measures.152 Although the State and Territory legislation is substantially similar 
to the Commonwealth’s, the High Court has only considered the legislation in Victoria, Western 
Australia and New South Wales. A clear body of case law has not emerged from the High Court and a 
coherent body of jurisprudence from superior courts in the States and Territories has not filled this gap 
either. This means that there is little guidance for lower courts and tribunals about how to apply and 
interpret the law.153 
The small body of case law also affects the complaint resolution process. Decisions that make it 
difficult for the complainant to establish discrimination may influence a complainant’s decision to 
settle, particularly if they have legal advice. The small body of decided cases gives the equality 
commissions and lawyers little authority for interpreting the law, meaning they are less certain about 
how the tribunal would decide a complaint. Finally, limited case law means that potential respondents 
and the wider community do not know what compliance requires.  
There is great scope for an equality commission to institute a strategy to clarify untested principles and 
continue to develop the law. Since anti-discrimination law has been operating for over 30 years, the 
Australian equality commissions, like the UKDRC, could evaluate its stage of development and select 
principles to test in higher courts and unfavourable decisions to challenge. Two examples of 
unfavourable decisions which could be tested are Victoria v Schou154 and Purvis v New South Wales.155 
                                                 
147 Discrimination complainants do not receive Legal Aid, for instance. 
148 For example, the AHRC received 1779 discrimination complaints in 2006–07, yet the federal courts 
heard only 12 substantive matters in 2007. See generally Dominique Allen, ‘Behind the Conciliation 
Doors Settling Discrimination Complaints in Victoria’ (2009) 18 Griffith Law Review 778, 780 Table 
1. 
149 See generally Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70; Australian Iron & Steel v Banovic (1989) 168 
CRL 165; Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349; IW v Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1; 
X v Commonwealth (1999) 200 CLR 177; Purvis v New South Wales (2003) 217 CLR 92; New South 
Wales v Amery (2006) 226 ALR 196. This excludes a number of the High Court cases in which the 
procedural implications of anti-discrimination law have been considered: see, eg, University of 
Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447; Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 
373; Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245. 
150 Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349; IW v Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1; X v 
Commonwealth (1999) 200 CLR 177; Purvis v New South Wales (2003) 217 CLR 92. 
151 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70. 
152 Ibid.  
153 See generally Neil Rees, Katherine Lindsay, Simon Rice, Australian Anti-Discrimination Law: Text, 
Cases & Materials (Federation Press, 2008) 28. 
154  (2004) 8 VR 120. 
155 (2003) 217 CLR 92. 
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In most jurisdictions,156 to establish indirect discrimination the complainant is required to prove inter 
alia that the requirement, condition or practice in question was unreasonable.157 ‘Reasonableness’ is the 
pivotal element on which the definition of indirect discrimination is centred: if the complainant cannot 
establish that the respondent’s behaviour was unreasonable, it means that a requirement, condition or 
practice which would otherwise have constituted indirect discrimination is not unlawful. In Victoria v 
Schou, the Victorian Court of Appeal interpreted the reasonableness requirement narrowly, making it 
more difficult for the complainant to establish indirect discrimination.158 In a direct discrimination 
complaint, the complainant must establish that a person of a different status (‘the comparator’) was or 
would have been treated differently than they were.159 The High Court’s decision in Purvis v New 
South Wales (‘Purvis’) complicated the already difficult process of identifying the comparator. The 
child complainant in Purvis suffered from a severe brain injury which caused violent behaviour and he 
was expelled from school. The question before the High Court was whether the manifestation of the 
child complainant’s disability — his violent outbursts — were part of the disability and thus excluded 
from the comparison, or whether they were to be considered as part of the same or similar 
circumstances. The majority found that since the child’s violent outbursts led to his expulsion from 
school, it would be artificial to remove them from the objective circumstances. They identified the 
relevant comparator as a student who engaged in the same violent behaviour but who did not have a 
disability.160 The Court did not limit its reasoning to disability discrimination and Purvis has been 
applied in other contexts.161 The equality commission’s strategy could include pursuing a line of cases 
which modify — and ultimately limit — the unfavourable impact of these decisions. 
Following a strategic approach, the Australian equality commissions could also use the law in under–
utilised areas and those which have caused difficulties. For instance, considering how difficult race 
discrimination complaints are to prove,162 this would be an ideal area to focus on. The equality 
commission could assist a range of strong race discrimination cases and develop the jurisprudence in 
this area. Australia has a long history of race discrimination and its effects are still felt, particularly by 
Indigenous peoples who suffer disproportionate levels of disadvantage compared with the non-
Indigenous population. Assisting race discrimination complaints, particularly those made by 
Indigenous complainants, would highlight that race discrimination continues to be a problem163 and it 
would develop the body of case law in this area.  
It is worth noting, as part of this discussion, that appearing in litigation is another useful way the 
equality commissions can endeavour to develop the law. As noted in Part II, some of the Australian 
equality commissions already have an amicus curiae or an intervention power. If the equality 
commissions are to be advocates, rather than gatekeepers, it follows that they should all have such 
powers. Intervening in litigation relevant to discrimination and equality is considered to be a function 
incidental to the equality commission’s mandate of addressing discrimination. It was for this reason 
that the House of Lords held that, although the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission did not 
have the express power to intervene in litigation, intervention was a power incidental to the 
Commission’s express duties and thus it could exercise it.164 The benefits of litigation powers are that 
                                                 
156 The exceptions are indirect discrimination in Queensland and federal sex, disability and age indirect 
discrimination complaints: Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) ss 204, 205; Sex Discrimination Act 
1984 (Cth) s 7C; Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 6(4); Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) s 
15(2).  
157 See, eg, Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 9.  
158 Victoria v Schou (2004) 8 VR 120, 128–31. 
159 See, eg, Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 8(1).  
160 Purvis (2003) 217 CLR 92, 137 (Glesson CJ); see also at 185 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ).  
161 See, eg, Zygorodimos v Department of Education and Training [2004] VCAT 128 (3 February 
2004) [51]–[58] (Deputy President McKenzie); Howe v Qantas Airways Ltd [2004] FMCA 242 (15 
October 2004) [118]. 
162 See also Jonathon Hunyor, ‘Skin-deep: Proof and Inferences of Racial Discrimination in 
Employment’ (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 535. 
163 The ECNI continues to assist religious discrimination complaints for a similar reason — that the 
ongoing existence of this form of discrimination is highly relevant to that society. Likewise, 
highlighting the ongoing discrimination of Indigenous peoples is important in Australia if inequality is 
to be reduced. 
164 Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2002] UKHL 25 (20 June 2002). Barry expresses 
the same opinion about equality commissions generally: Eilis Barry, ‘Interventions and Amicus Curiae 
Applications, Making Individual Enforcement More Effective’ in Dagmar Shiek, Lisa Waddington and 
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they enable the equality commission to raise broader issues which the individual parties are not 
concerned with and unlikely to have the resources to argue.165 In addition, they enable the equality 
commission to influence cases other than discrimination complaints which relate to equality and 
disadvantage.166 The equality commission offers the court its expertise and brings its opinion of how 
the law should be interpreted and policy considerations to the proceedings. However, these powers 
should be exercised in keeping with the equality commission’s overall strategy, which is how the 
UKDRC and USEEOC regard these powers. 
 
C    Maintaining the Law’s Profile 
The equality commission’s assistance work is a useful way of maintaining the law’s profile. The 
overseas equality commissions do this in two ways: by resisting confidential settlements; and by 
regularly releasing information about complaints into the public sphere. At this point, it is important to 
recall that the vast majority of discrimination complaints in Australia are not resolved through a court 
hearing; they are withdrawn or settled prior. The terms of settlement are usually confidential and the 
Australian equality commissions release very little information — not even in a de-identified form — 
about the type of complaints made or how they were resolved.167 The promise of confidentiality will 
often be necessary to get the parties to the negotiating table168 but it limits the law’s development. 
Confidentiality restricts the available information about the conciliation process, meaning later 
conciliation participants do not have access to information, nor can the process deter would-be 
discriminators. The absence of information, even in a de-identified form, that the equality commissions 
make available compounds this problem. Most importantly, confidentiality masks the extent to which 
discrimination remains a problem in society. 
 
1    Resisting Confidentiality 
As discussed above, both the USEEOC and ECNI have strict policies regarding confidentiality: neither 
will agree to a confidentiality clause as part of a settlement. The equality commission’s ability to do 
this rests on its stronger bargaining power compared to an individual acting on their own.169 Mary 
Kitson said that over time respondents have come to accept that the ECNI will not agree to 
                                                                                                                                            
Mark Bell, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Non-
Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 8.IE.20. Following the House of Lords decision, 
the United Kingdom equality commissions were more willing to intervene in litigation: McColgan, 
above n 29, 385. 
165 For example, the UKCRE, UKEOC and UKDRC intervened in the Court of Appeal’s decision Igen 
v Wong [2005] ICR 931(‘Igen’), in which the Court clarified the operation of a recent legislative 
amendment to the burden of proof in discrimination cases. The Court’s interpretation of the operation 
of the shift in burden had implications for future complainants, but the complainants in Igen would not 
necessarily have had the expertise, the resources or the desire to make broader policy arguments, 
whereas the equality commissions could. 
166 See further O’Brien, ‘Accentuating the Positive’, above n 68, discussing how the UKDRC used the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) to overcome defects in DDA(UK). 
167 For further discussion of the pros and cons of the prominence of confidentiality in this jurisdiction 
and the lack of information about complaints released by the equality commissions, see Allen, above n 
148, 781–3.  
168 According to Thornton, without confidentiality, respondents would not be prepared to be labelled as 
wrongdoers and complainants may be deterred from lodging a complaint: Margaret Thornton, 
‘Equivocations of Conciliation: The Resolution of Discrimination Complaints in Australia’ (1989) 52 
Modern Law Review 733, 740. See also comments by equality commission staff and lawyers on the 
importance of confidentiality: ibid 786. 
169 Lisa Sirkin, Mary Kitson and Carol Ann Woulfe all commented on the equality commission’s 
stronger bargaining position in this regard: Interview with Lisa Sirkin, Supervisory Trial Attorney, 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (New York City, 12 September 2007); Interview with 
Mary Kitson, Senior Legal Officer, Equality Commission for Northern Ireland (Belfast, 25 September 
2007); Interview with Carol Anne Woulfe, Solicitor, Equality Authority (Dublin, 26 September 2007). 
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confidentiality. They also know that the Commission does not have to negotiate because, unlike an 
individual, it has the resources to run cases if necessary.170  
However, public settlements are not appropriate for all complainants or for all types of complaints and 
they may deter potential complainants.171 While non-confidential settlements should certainly be the 
starting position, a strict policy, like the USEEOC and ECNI have, is not preferred. The law’s 
objectives would not be fulfilled if people were discouraged from applying for assistance because they 
feared publicity. It is for this reason that the IEA does not have such an aggressive policy as the ECNI. 
Carol Ann Woulfe, Solicitor at the IEA, said this might deter those who genuinely need assistance from 
approaching the IEA.172 Although the IEA prefers that settlements are not confidential, it balances that 
preference with recognising that there are times when matters need to be confidential, even when that 
means the IEA cannot maximise their impact through publicity.173 For example, in 2007, the IEA 
wanted to publicise the facts of a settled complaint because it highlighted issues surrounding the influx 
of non-Irish workers. In return for confidentiality, the respondent offered the complainant the 
maximum compensation the Equality Tribunal could award and the complainant agreed.174  
Whether or not to agree to confidentiality should be discretionary and flexible, according to the 
circumstances of the complaint. For instance, the equality commission may attempt to negotiate a 
clause which enables it to publicise some aspects of the complaint, such as the relevant industry or the 
outcome negotiated. Factors the equality commission may consider in assessing the need for 
confidentiality are: the nature of the discriminatory behaviour including its extent and whether or not it 
is systemic; whether the respondent is a ‘repeat offender’ and, if so, how previous complaints were 
resolved; and the respondent’s willingness to effectively address the complaint in return for 
confidentiality, such as by taking wider, systemic action. On each occasion, it will be necessary to 
strike a balance between the complainant’s needs and the community’s needs and this should be a 
policy matter for the equality commission to decide. 
 
2    Releasing Information to the Community 
The overseas equality commissions publicise the complaints they assist, both identified and 
anonymously. For example, the UKDRC would issue a media release when it settled a complaint and 
after successful litigation,175 as does the USEEOC.176 The IEA publishes identified information about 
the cases it assists, including those which are settled, in its Annual Report177 and the ECNI publishes an 
annual Decisions and Settlements Review. The Review includes identified facts and outcomes of all the 
complaints that the ECNI assisted during that period.178 Releasing information about the complaints 
helps the equality commission to maintain the law’s profile and increase the law’s ripple effect by: 
showing that the law is being enforced, which may deter would-be discriminators; and by promoting 
awareness of the legislation, which may encourage other complainants to come forward. The latter is 
                                                 
170 Interview with Mary Kitson, Senior Legal Officer, Equality Commission for Northern Ireland 
(Belfast, 25 September 2007). 
171 For example, sexual orientation. Mary Kitson said that very few people came forward to make 
complaints about discrimination based on sexual orientation, partly because of the publicity attached 
both to settlement and hearing: ibid. 
172 Interview with Carol Anne Woulfe, Solicitor, Equality Authority (Dublin, 26 September 2007). 
173 Carol Ann Woulfe recalled a complaint about a local authority’s failure to reasonably accommodate 
a mother and her autistic child. The case highlighted poor procedures and lack of disability awareness. 
The Tribunal ordered the authority to provide the mother with a house within a year, so its impact was 
potentially great. However, the mother thought it would be difficult for herself and the child if their 
names were made public so they were kept confidential: ibid.  
174 Ibid. An order for compensation is capped under the Equal Status Act 2000–2004 (Ireland) s 27 at 
€6349 and the Employment Equality Act 1998–2004 (Ireland) s 82(4) at two years pay and €12 697 for 
someone who was not an employee. 
175 See, eg, UKDRC, ‘Appeal Court Rules Airport and Airline Jointly Responsible for Disabled 
Passengers’ (Media Release, 21 December 2004); UKDRC, ‘Jessops Pays Compensation to Disabled 
Man Who Couldn’t Get into Store’ (Media Release, 18 September 2007)  
<http://drc.uat.rroom.net/DRC/newsroom/news_releases.aspx>.  
176 See, eg, above n 115. 
177 See, eg, IEA, Annual Report, above n 47. 
178 See, eg, ECNI, Decisions and Settlements Review, above n 132.  
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one reason the ECNI publicises the facts and outcomes of the complaints it assists. Mary Kitson said, 
‘if we publish outcomes of our cases people know, “oh that happened to me, I should complain”’.179 
Therefore, publicising settlements and outcomes shows that discrimination still exists, victims can 
obtain relief, and the law prohibits discrimination and it will be enforced. 
 
C    The Threat of Litigation 
Currently, the Australian equality commissions undertake various promotional activities to encourage 
voluntary compliance with the law. For instance, the AHRC engages in education, research, media 
work and community outreach activities. However, the ‘carrot’ of voluntary compliance becomes more 
attractive to potential respondents if the equality commission also wields the ‘stick’ of enforcement. 
The USEEOC actually litigates very few charges,180 but to strengthen its ability to settle charges, the 
Commission believes it is critical to have a ‘credible and visible litigation program’.181 Lisa Sirkin, 
Supervisory Trial Attorney at the USEEOC’s New York District Office, said that for some respondents 
the threat of a lawsuit is the best way to encourage compliance voluntarily:  
[Y]ou can do conciliation and all that, but … some companies, some people are not going to 
look at you twice unless they know that you can bring them to court and it’s going to cost them 
a lot of money and bad publicity.182 
Regulatory theorists, such as Braithwaite, argue that persuasion will be more effective in securing 
compliance when it is supported by punishment.183 Braithwaite proposes a regulatory pyramid with 
persuasion at its base. This progressively escalates in stages if voluntary compliance is unsuccessful 
until it reaches punitive sanctions at the pyramid’s apex.184 Based on this idea, Hepple, Coussey and 
Choudhury developed an enforcement pyramid designed to regulate equal opportunities.185 At the 
pyramid’s base is persuasion, then education. Above them is a voluntary action plan to promote ‘best 
practice’. This escalates to equality commission investigation, followed by it issuing a compliance 
notice for failure to comply with the commission’s requests. At the upper levels are judicial 
enforcement and then sanctions. Withdrawal of government contracts or licences sits on the apex.186 
The discussion in this article has taken a narrow approach to enforcement, focusing on assistance, and 
ultimately litigation, as a means of enforcing the law. Primarily this is because assistance has been the 
principal means of enforcement used by the overseas equality commissions; they have faced political 
resistance to the idea of exercising their investigative functions.187 Within the framework of this 
discussion, the upper levels of Hepple et al’s enforcement pyramid are more relevant.  
The regulatory approach suggests that introducing the ‘stick’ of enforcement via litigation may 
strengthen the appeal of the voluntary compliance mechanisms the Australian equality commissions 
already use. For this approach to be most effective, the threat of enforcement must be real and what 
                                                 
179 Interview with Mary Kitson, Senior Legal Officer, Equality Commission for Northern Ireland 
(Belfast, 25 September 2007).  
180 The Commission litigates less than 2 per cent of total charges in the New York District: Interview 
with Lisa Sirkin, Supervisory Trial Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (New York 
City, 12 September 2007). As at 2002, nationally it litigated less than 300 cases of the approximately 
80 000 charges that were filed: EEOC v Waffle House Inc 534 US 279 (2002), 290. 
181 Igasaki and Miller, above n 60, III. 
182 Interview with Lisa Sirkin, Supervisory Trial Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (New York City, 12 September 2007). 
183 John Braithwaite, ‘Rewards and Regulation’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 12, 19. 
184 Ibid 20, Figure 2, citing Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (Oxford Socio-Legal Studies, 1995) 33. 
185 Bob Hepple, Mary Coussey and Tufyal Choudhury, Equality: A New Framework — Report of the 
Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation (Hart Publishing, 2000) 
ch 3. 
186 Ibid particularly 58–9, [3.6] and Figure 3.1. This approach is reflected in the enforcement activities 
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compliance entails must be clear. The respondent must believe that a complaint may be made against 
them and that the equality commission will enforce it. In essence, this threat is what the USEEOC 
relies upon to encourage compliance, as the earlier comment from Sirkin demonstrates.188 Similarly, 
Niall Crowley, the IEA’s former Chief Executive Officer, writes: 
Employers and service providers need to be clear that where discrimination happens 
enforcement will follow. The legislation needs to be seen to be regularly enforced or it will fail 
to have any significant impact.189 
Further, encouraging voluntary compliance requires clear law. Sternlight writes that society needs 
‘clear and public precedents to deter future wrongdoers and let persons know what conduct is 
permissible’.190 Respondents need to know what compliance requires, so the equality commission 
needs to disseminate information about successful cases to increase awareness of what is permitted and 
what is prohibited. Alter and Vargas write that if a respondent knows that they could lose at court, they 
will be more willing to adjust their policies and practices voluntarily. They concur that the ‘credible 
threat … [of litigation] can be a weapon in itself’.191 The threat of litigation relies on the equality 
commission’s much stronger bargaining power — the respondent knows that the equality commission 
has the resources to litigate if necessary, unlike most individuals.192 This explains why the overseas 
equality commissions are able to negotiate wider remedies when they settle an assisted complaint. For 
example, when the UKDRC settles complaints on behalf of individuals, in some instances it has 
secured wider remedies than a court could have ordered.193 In those situations, the respondents 
voluntarily agreed to change their practices and enter into a binding agreement with the UKDRC194 as 
part of settling the complaint rather than risk litigation.  
 
D    The Equality Commission Becomes a ‘Repeat Player’ 
Galanter has suggested that parties in litigation can be divided into two types — One–Shotters, who are 
involved in litigation only on occasion, and Repeat Players, who are involved in several court actions 
over time.195 A complainant in a discrimination case is typically a One–Shotter: they expect the case to 
be their only experience of litigation, the stakes are high and the cost of enforcing their rights may 
outweigh the potential outcome.196 Respondents are typically Repeat Players, for instance a large 
employer or government department. Typically, they have taken part in litigation before and probably 
will again, the stakes are low and they have the resources to pursue long-term interests.197  
If an equality commission regularly takes part in litigation, either through assisting complainants or 
appearing as a third party, it can develop the characteristics of a Repeat Player and experience the 
advantages Galanter identifies.198 First, a Repeat Player has advance intelligence since they have taken 
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part in similar litigation before. Therefore, they are already familiar with the arguments and 
practicalities of running a case. Second, Repeat Players develop expertise and have access to 
specialists. For example, the British equality commissions benefited from the continuous involvement 
of prominent academics and barristers in their legal assistance and litigation work.199 This relates to a 
third advantage; Repeat Players have the opportunity to develop facilitative informal relationships with 
institutions.200 Fourth, Repeat Players can play the odds. Galanter argues that the stakes are lower for a 
Repeat Player than a One-Shotter, so the former can develop a strategy to maximise gains over a series 
of cases. This relates to the fifth and sixth advantages; the Repeat Player can play for changes to rules 
or precedent, as well as immediate gains, and it can play for changes to litigation or procedural rules.  
An illustration of how the equality commissions can benefit from the advantages of being a Repeat 
Player is the line of cases pursued by the UKDRC to moderate the detrimental impact of a Court of 
Appeal decision.201 In Jones v The Post Office (‘Jones’),202 the Court of Appeal examined the 
justification defence to a direct discrimination complaint on the ground of disability. The Court found 
that there was a low threshold to establish the defence, making it easier for employers to escape 
liability.203 Realising the potentially negative impact of the Jones decision, the UKDRC developed a 
litigation strategy that attempted to moderate its impact. The Commission pursued what O’Brien 
describes as ‘a consistent thread of argument in the higher courts’.204 This led the Commission to 
support a complainant in the first House of Lords decision to consider the DDA(UK), which ultimately 
limited the effect of the Jones decision.205 This example shows how the UKDRC could ‘play the odds’ 
and utilise its resources to change a rule, whereas the One–Shotter’s attention will be on their 
immediate gain or remedy; they are not concerned with the operation of similar litigation in the future. 
It is for this reason, Galanter says, that he expects precedents to favour the Repeat Player: they expect 
to be involved in litigation again, so they are concerned with how the law operates and are more likely 
to appeal cases which will produce favourable outcomes.206  
The body of anti-discrimination case law in Australia is relatively small. Much of it favours 
respondents who have the resources to appeal unfavourable decisions.207 Following Galanter’s 
reasoning, the equality commission could take advantage of being a Repeat Player and attempt to 
adjust the balance in the case law so that there are more outcomes favourable to complainants; the 
equality commission then becomes the Repeat Player who enjoys the advantage in litigation, rather 
than the respondent. An equality commission may enjoy a slightly modified version of Galanter’s 
advantages because in one way, it is an unusual Repeat Player. The equality commission must consider 
the complainant’s interests in addition to its strategic objectives. Accordingly, it may settle more cases 
than a typical Repeat Player. Settlement is generally an issue in strategic litigation, as considered 
below. 
 
E    Limitations of Assisting Complainants 
Two criticisms of the equality commission engaging in assistance work were noted at the outset: 
assisting complainants can consume the equality commission’s resources and stumbling upon a 
‘landmark’ case can be accidental. Taking a strategic approach to assistance work overcomes these two 
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issues, as discussed. This section presents some of the shortcomings of assistance and raises some 
ethical issues that the equality commissions may face in assisting complainants.  
First, it can be difficult to predict which complaints are ‘strategic’. The experience of some involved in 
this work is that it is often the seemingly ordinary complaints that later become strategic and they are 
not usually offered assistance.208 However, the equality commission could subsequently assist such 
cases once they reach the higher courts and are regarded as ‘strategic’. Second, there are limits to 
relying on litigation to develop the law. It is not guaranteed that a case will succeed, for instance, or 
that an outcome will be favourable. Nor is there any assurance that a successful case will result in 
favourable legislative reform. For these reasons, the equality commissions that used assistance 
strategically did not rely on it solely to change the law. They pursued litigation after other avenues 
failed. For example, the UKEOC began by extensively lobbying the Conservative government. It was 
only when that approach was unsuccessful that it began taking cases to the ECJ. The UKDRC also 
pursued other strategies and did not resort to litigation immediately.209 Therefore, the equality 
commission should not forgo its other law reform work, such as research, education and lobbying. 
Litigation and assistance thus forms part of a multi-pronged strategy which ultimately seeks to benefit 
marginalised groups.  
Third, assisting complainants consumes resources. Even though the ECNI is well resourced in 
comparison to other equality commissions, on occasion its legal budget has been stretched.210 
Moreover, the equality commission’s assistance and enforcement work are often the first things that are 
reduced if the institution’s budget is cut.211 Budgetary problems were one reason the UKCRE wound 
back its assistance work in 2003 and introduced a targeted approach.212 Again, this highlights the 
importance of taking a strategic approach. To work within budgetary realities, the equality commission 
has to adapt its assistance work around its available funds by taking a strategic approach and 
determining the most effective use of its resource dollars. 
Fourth, not every complainant will want their complaint to be the one that is pursued to the highest 
court. In most instances, this will require a long-term commitment and delay in receiving a remedy.213 
The complainant will have to give evidence and may be subject to media attention. The complainant 
has many things to consider before agreeing to receive the equality commission’s assistance. 
Presumably, some will decide that the financial support and the equality commission’s backing 
outweigh other considerations.  
The fifth shortcoming is if the complainant settles. Not only does settlement prevent a precedent, the 
equality commission does not benefit from the resources it expends, financial or otherwise. None of the 
equality commissions considered in this article will prevent a complainant from settling; they accept 
this risk. The ECNI’s approach moderates the risk by requiring the settlement agreement to include 
something that benefits persons other than the complainant. In this way, the Commission can justify its 
expended resources.  
The two preceding shortcomings highlight the tension between the equality commission’s desire to 
secure a precedent or remedy that benefits other members of the community and the complainant’s 
desire to resolve the complaint expeditiously and appropriately. The equality commission must manage 
that tension and act in an ethical way that does not compromise the complainant or result in a conflict 
between the complainant’s needs and the equality commission’s interests. Therefore, in addition to 
developing criteria for which cases to assist, the equality commission should develop guidelines for 
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resolving complaints. For example, it may be prudent for the equality commission’s in-house lawyers 
to assist the complainant with the early stages of preparing and lodging their complaint and use 
external lawyers if ADR is unsuccessful so that the equality commission remains at arm’s length from 
decisions about resolving the complaint. It would also be appropriate for the equality commission to 
make the complainant aware from the outset that it is interested in their case because of its strategic 
potential and it would prefer a systemic outcome, but ultimately the complainant bears the 
responsibility for how the complaint is resolved.  
Finally, although enabling the equality commission to assist complaints would add a new dimension to 
enforcement in Australia, it does not move the law away from the individual complaints based system. 
The primary limitations of that system are that it is passive, retrospective and reactionary.214 The law 
does not pre-empt discriminatory behaviour; rather, it offers a resolution after the fact. There is no 
obligation on employers or service providers to take anticipatory action to address policies or practices 
that could disadvantage certain groups; the law only requires the respondent to take action to remedy 
unlawful behaviour once a successful complaint is made. O’Cinneide explains: 
The individual enforcement model relies excessively on an approach that resembles sending a 
fire engine to fight a fire rather than preventing that fire in the first place. The existing formal 
legislative approach eliminates difference, not disadvantage.215 
O’Cinneide’s description highlights the need for a model which prevents the ‘fire’ by getting to the 
source of the ‘flame’. This suggests that preventing discrimination is insufficient on its own; the law 
should also positively promote equality. That is the conclusion Britain reached after an individual 
complaints–based system failed to address systemic racism in the London Metropolitan Police Force.216 
Therefore, although investing the equality commission with an assistance role is valuable for the 
reasons proposed above, the limits of solely relying on a reactive and passive system to address 
discrimination must be acknowledged.   
 
V    CONCLUSION 
The premise of this article is that the Australian equality commissions should discontinue handling 
discrimination complaints so that they are free to advise and assist complainants without any 
expectation that they will act neutrally. The article  examined one enforcement method used by 
equality commissions in other countries — assisting complainants with resolving their complaint. This 
was chosen for discussion because to date equality commissions in Australia have not engaged in this 
work and it could be incorporated into the existing legal structure. Examples from other countries show 
how much can be achieved, legally and remedially, if the equality commission has the freedom — and 
also the resources — to take a strategic approach to enforcing and developing the law. By assisting 
individual complainants, the equality commission can tackle other instances of discrimination, 
strengthen and develop the law and increase the law’s ‘ripple effect’ on other instances of 
discrimination. 
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